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MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. DULL *file*

Herewith is the translation you requested
of the article by Hans Gisevius.

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redefine the rights and obligations resulting from a wholly changed situation.

It is an historic fact that those contemporaries who are directly affected seldom comprehend the real meaning of these eruptive events. They deplore the symptoms, but they seize upon all pacifying declarations lavishly made by both the usurpers and the oppressed. The prevailing tendency is to make appear harmless that which, if looked at seriously, would force them to give up the obsolete rules adhered to until now. For this reason it took some time until the scared world recognized as an unchangable reality that event which stood out most markedly among the confusing events of our revolutionary century, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Even then a fateful period of time lapsed until those who were so disagreeably frightened decided to bring their political theories and practices in accord with the hard facts.

Difficult Process of Adaptation

Nevertheless one must say that it took an astonishingly long time until the United States realized it. Stubborn unwillingness to recognize facts changed to arrogant indifference; ignorant desertion of principles, especially among intellectuals, was followed by hysterical fright coupled with rash threats of war. It will not be admitted, but even during the last presidential election the voters had the idea that all it takes to "liberate" the oppressed on both sides of the pre-Revolutionary Russian borders from Communist domination is a determined and militarily strong leadership.

There are many reasons why it was so difficult for the Americans to adapt themselves in time to the historical events which challenged

THE DILEMMA OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

by

Dr Hans Bernd Gisevius

As has been pointed out by the Volkswirt in its timely observations, the effects of the present world-political situation on Bonn's foreign policy make it especially important to consider carefully what may reasonably be expected from Washington within the coming months and years. We therefore recommend thoughtful reading of the following article by Hans Bernd Gisevius and an additional one which will be published in the next issue. Anyone who knows Gisevius also knows that he definitely cannot be called anti-American. Nonetheless, he has warned his friends for years not to overestimate American capabilities really to stick to a policy of strength regarding the German problem.

Whoever wants to understand fully the dramatic changes in American foreign policy from Wilson to Eisenhower or to make a somewhat reliable estimate of future actions as well as reactions must bear in mind how unusually long it has taken Washington to realize the fact of the Bolshevik Revolution in all its world-political aspects. Having hardly begun to include the revolutionary changes into a rational foreign policy calculation, one has the feeling, while going through this hazardous and painful process of adaptation, of being overrun by an even more violent revolution. The rapid atomic developments have upset all hitherto-held concepts of politics and warfare, and their furious pace has made it emotionally and rationally impossible to

them more than any other Western nation; this is true for all fields: state and social order, economy, and ideology. At first the geographical location offered a welcome excuse to withdraw once more from an unaccustomed situation into the splendid isolation of self-righteous morality. As Khrushchev recently remarked scornfully, for 16 years one simply had not recognized the reality of the Reds, just as is the case today in regard to China. When in 1933 Litvinov achieved the aim of diplomatic good conduct, one was so busy in aiming the overflowing moral wrath at the fascist trouble-makers that the necessary presence of mind was lacking to think about the far-reaching changes which had to come with the Bolshevik consolidation. War and elation of victory let further valuable years go by until at last one could see Stalin as what he proclaimed himself to be from the beginning; not as the good natured "Uncle Joe", but as a revolutionist on a large scale who plays for keeps.

What happened afterwards took place with American speed, though also with that 200-percent thoroughness as can only be achieved in this country of advertisement and mass influence. The anti-Communist panic blossomed out in a strange manner. Again the modern crusaders rallied; however, their aim got lost in domestic politics. This brought about the advantage that proven dictators or Communists, with Tito out front, could fight for "freedom" abroad, while the new dealers of the Roosevelt and Truman school had to take the blame for the "lost peace". Both parties avoided the principal problem with cheap accusations or vehement excuses. Again one preferred not to recognize that world-political tension, caused by the combination of Communist ideology and Stalin's lust for power, had built up energies whose breakthrough to new political realities could simply no longer be stopped.

The Beginning of Normalization

As an afterthought it must be considered as particularly fortunate that the notorious Senator McCarthy, an incompetent demagogue, forced himself on the scene to personify this critical confusion. Thanks to his repulsive appearance, the anti-Communist psychosis not only lost ground in an unusually short time, but brought about a general sobering up and a process of normalization at the same time. At last it became possible to do what should have been done for 30 years and what has been overdue for 10 years. The USA in 1955 started to understand that the phenomenon of Bolshevism cannot be overcome by a type of defensive imperialism. Now one understands that the comfortable practice to fix a status quo for various continents and countries by using varying historic key dates is definitely past in Asia, in Africa, and, unfortunately, also in Europe. Whether one wants to or not, one must take into account the forced change brought about by the Leninist and Stalinist revolution in proper relationship to one's own role as the largest, and still strongest, world power.

The Asian Example

One would do well to look again at what has happened; not in order to shake one's head about the incomprehensible things from Yalta to McCarthy, but in order to become impressed with how much vigor the straightforward personality of Eisenhower has speeded up the process to bring about a change in thinking. In the few years of his active political life he has not only maintained his unusual popularity, but has even increased it. Furthermore, he was able to exert great influence with a few foreign-policy decisions which he personally made in critical moments, to such an extent that, with regard to foreign policy, his term of office may be of the same far-reaching significance as that of Roosevelt.

To cite a particularly thought-provoking example, it was up to Eisenhower to wrest from a reactionary majority in Congress, one composed of Southern Democrats and Republicans, something which no Democratic President had been able to obtain with equal ease, namely the liquidation of positions in Asia which had become untenable. The battle for China had already narrowed down to the final bargaining over Chiang Kai-shek's Formosa position. The refusal to intervene actively in southern Indochina was in line with last year's Geneva compromise. South Korea, which is becoming an increasingly greater political liability, has significance only on paper as a strategic jumping-off point. And, as far as the only remaining "bastion" is concerned, American diplomacy is naturally doing its utmost to retain Japan within its sphere of influence. On the other hand, the recent visit of Japan's Foreign Minister is demonstrative of the hesitant manner in which Washington is handling this delicate problem. Deprived of power, the hard-pressed island nation has no other alternative, than to watch its every move carefully, so as not to be crushed between the millstones of Russian and American imperialism. The strongest test of the new and irrevocable Asia policy, introduced by Eisenhower, will come when the price for Japan's neutralization will have to be paid; this time may be closer at hand than is comfortable from the strategic and prestige points of view arrived at after the many painful setbacks in Southeast Asia.

The care taken to leave an opening for the withdrawal to a new defense line can be easily seen from the elaborate proceedings at the time of the establishment of the Asiatic counterpart to the North Atlantic Pact. From the propaganda point of view the new pact was exploited to the utmost; yet, when it came to the exact outlining of the obligations which had been assumed, it was the American Foreign Minister himself who took all the teeth, militarily speaking, out of the South East Asia Pact (SEATO).

The Great Policy Change

It seems incomprehensible how often theory and practice have been so far apart during this period of adaptation. Whereas the British have carried out their Asiatic retrenchment so well-planned as to virtually offset the colonial loss with a gain in prestige, the Americans accompany this inevitable development with an anti-Communist tirade which threatens to obliterate their proud anti-colonial history in a matter of a few years. How can it be explained that they, who have never had any bases in Asia except for the Philippines, consider the "loss" of Asia as though their most precious crown jewels were being stolen?

The answer is not hard to find and is not limited to the Asian sphere of power. As happens so often when a reorientation occurs, the two policies overlap; since the "new" policy was hardly 7 years younger than the "old" one, the contradictions were so vividly noticeable. Occasionally, it was difficult to see where and to what extent the two policies overlapped. However, it can be said with certainty that this gropingly, and often even unwillingly, executed change in policy will in the foreseeable future find expression in a completely different basic evaluation of the problem, to be divided into categories of "desirable," "possible," and "absolutely essential."

A great deal of faith, presumably too much so from the very beginning, has been placed in the policy of containment since 1948. Without doubt, this policy has been the most thought-out concept of American foreign policy to date. The concept included more than merely the limiting of Russian expansion. This determined strangulation of the revolutionary impetus was expected to create intensified political crises within the Red dictatorship. And, in the knowledge of having an atomic monopoly, brave expectations were

being harbored to the effect that an increasingly strong policy of military preparedness would sooner or later force the Iron Curtain back to the former Russian boundaries. The speed with which visible results had to be achieved could be seen from the atomic deadline conceived, which however, turned out to be embarrassingly erroneous; what seemed then to be a correct evaluation of the Russian scientific and technical potential fixed a leeway of only ten years.

There is no need to go any further into the question of how many rational and irrational miscalculations had been made in this new strategy, regardless of the logic of the individual arguments. Two things are certain. In order to make their actions decisively effective, the Americans had to make political demands which normally they would hardly have made with such insistence. Simultaneously they had to produce such impressive military results with their build-up of alliances and bases that the strategists of the opposing camp were made to feel that they were facing no mere empty demonstration but outright pressure. Today, when arguments and statistics confuse the mind, it seems appropriate to be reminded of the requirement considered essential by American diplomats and agreed to by the Allies at the time when the "policy of strength" was at its height. In February 1952, the Lisbon agreement called for 9,000 aircraft and 96 divisions by 1954, because otherwise this policy would become meaningless.

Forward to New Solutions

At that time, nothing was more unjustified than to talk of imperialism or even warmongering. No nation is less imperialistic than the American; America will never again permit itself to be driven into a world war through bias and prejudice. On the contrary, somewhat belatedly but not too late, America recognized the unexpectedly rapid rise of Bolshevik Russia to No. 2 position among the world powers

and decided to draw conclusions befitting a major power for the sake of effecting a balance in world politics. It was the "enlightened self-interest," so often cited by Eisenhower, which motivated President Truman to accept the challenge of the Cold War, entailing extraordinary financial and military expenditures. The many unpleasant excesses, dangerous self-deceptions, and other unpleasant happenings which occurred in the course of events can be justified by the claim that otherwise the masses could not have been aroused. The events of recent months have adequately shown how unpopular the Cold War is with the American people, who are so very much inclined toward the "live and let live" principle of coexistence.

Hence, when all things point to the fact that the Geneva Summit Conference is signalling a decisive change in American foreign policy, President Eisenhower must have been motivated toward this new orientation by similarly urgent reasons of state, and not by the lack of fortitude or the desire to return to the old formula -- a new orientation which is also binding for his grumbling advisers, as well as for his as yet unknown successors. Thus far, the policy has no name or clear definition. Nevertheless, the decisive criterion has already been determined. The policy no longer permits any return to the Cold War. The only way open is to go forward toward new, constructive solutions, though difficult detours may be encountered -- else there is no alternative but atomic destruction. (Second article to follow.)

THE DILEMMA OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (II)

by

Dr Hans Bernd Gisevius

In this second article Dr Gisevius continues his observations on "The Delimma of American Foreign Policy" begun in the last issue of Volkswirt, and draws his timely conclusions.

No one will ever know just what principal force motivated those outstanding scientists, among them many refugees from Europe, to concentrate for a period of time on intensive research which led to the first atomic bomb explosion in the desert of New Mexico. Was it the anxiety to keep their secret from their German colleagues and thus to prevent Hitler from getting the jump on them? Or was it the fatalistic admission that such a decisive penetration into new realities could only be achieved indirectly through military application? The kindling of the atomic fire is the last and most poisonous fruit of that period of revolutionary world warfare, the first phase of which ended with the outbreak of the Russian Revolution; the next phase was one of totalitarian conflicts and excesses, which precipitated World War II; and now the period is rushing toward its dramatic final phase when the hydrogen bomb, in one way or another, will mark its end.

On 16 July 1945 this first experiment was a success -- and on the very next day 64 atomic scientists, deeply moved by what they had planned, hoped for, worked for, and feared, and now had seen with their own eyes, drew up that humane document in which

they warned President Truman against the use of the atomic bomb. Their warnings found no ears. Three weeks later came the horror of death to hundreds of thousands in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Once more the scientists raised their voices, but this time they did not limit themselves to a memorandum. Shining as a bright light in the darkness of the oncoming nuclear age is the love of truth, the courage, and the statesmanship of those "nonpolitical" men who, almost constantly swimming against the stream, have made the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists one of the most highly regarded political publications. These scientists are to be credited, to a great degree, for thwarting the attempt of the Pentagon to make the further development of atomic power a solely military responsibility. Naturally, the production of the bomb remained for the time being the primary objective; thus it was unavoidable to have severe security measures which hindered independent research and private economic exploitation. However, the principle of civilian responsibility prevailed.

The first official stand in regard to the new problems, the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, was likewise greatly influenced by this line of thought. This report proved convincingly that a worldwide supranational control over atomic power is imperative. Then, this promising development, i.e. to give the council of scientists who have the knowledge of this revolutionary secret the trusteeship over any political exploitation of the secret, unfortunately faltered. The Baruch plan started a move in the opposite direction. Within a few years all efforts to make a true evaluation of the nuclear revolution in time came to a dead end in an ever increasing confusion of dishonest proposals and counterproposals.

The Battle Against Better Judgment

For a long time it had been customary to criticize the Russian demand for outlawing the new weapons, as a necessary prerequisite to any discussions on the problem as the reason for the failure of international control. Washington announcements, which recently offered new suggestions while at the same time admitting that the Baruch plan is "outdated," show what little faith there had been that the plan could have been successful. Washington simply relied on the position of monopoly, which really did not exist, and nullified in advance its generous offer to give extensive controls to an international agency by demanding extensive "guarantees" as prerequisite. Today no one any longer wonders why the Russians did not accept. It is astonishing, however, that their ostentatious self-assurance could have been misunderstood so thoroughly for years.

Not even Truman's sensational announcement of September 1949 that an "atomic explosion" had been recorded in Russia could shake the plans of the military, and even less those of the politicians, based on absolute superiority of weapons. With all seriousness it was then argued that it was just an explosion of a probably unsuccessful experiment, a fiction which the Russians had masterfully supported by refraining from further experiments over a period of years. To be sure, efforts were being increased to develop the superbomb. But the tragic failure of the scientists, who wanted to prevent this march into a nuclear nihilism or at least explain to the public what alarming aspects had evolved not only regarding attack but even more so regarding defense, proved how strongly the monopoly illusions had taken hold.

Indeed, those triumphant reports on the frightening load carried by the bombers flying constantly in the same direction must have had an extremely encouraging effect. Nevertheless, since the successful hydrogen bomb experiments, i.e. since 1952, nothing has been revealed which had not been already announced in the gloomy forecasts of 1950 as the unavoidable consequences of the nuclear arms race.

There was a reluctance to draw these very conclusions. Because of the desire not even to discuss the consequences, the already rigorous security measures, with which a cordon of silence had been drawn around the world-shaking realities, were doubled. There is much that speaks for the fact that the American statesmen in 1950 had no other choice than to increase a thousandfold, through the superbomb their atomic potential which so prematurely had been described as sufficient. Nothing should have been more obvious to the harassed men of this new era than bravely to face the situation which they themselves were about to help create. Why then did they hide behind their curtain of red tape?

The answer is now known. The responsible politicians hesitated to state publicly what they scarcely dared to admit in private. The effect of the atomic bomb, to use Churchill's resigned statement, could still be calculated. It still left room for those manifold interpretations and excuses with which surprised politicians and military leaders have always avoided recognizing a revolutionary change until it was too late for them, though not for the big change. As for the hydrogen bomb, however, even in its experimental stage there was no longer room for any doubt whatsoever. With it coexistence of nations has become imperative -- a fact which even the frightening explosive power

of the two atomic bombs of 1945 has not been able to achieve. It is the lasting and probably the most significant expression of his term of office, when Eisenhower sized up the situation in the simple formula: "There is no longer any alternative to peace."

The Obvious Facts of the Case

The whole world would do well to understand these words as simply and as concisely as they have been spoken. Just think what has happened. The president of the strongest world power, at the same time one of the best informed generals in this super-armed world, a man whose calling involved both the preparation for and the waging of war, one who after 1945 did not hesitate at all to favor increased rearmament -- this "strong" President of the USA, whose first two years of office were filled with declarations of military preparedness, suddenly states that the alternative to peace, i.e., war, no longer exists. He states this at a time when everyone knows that highest political and military advisers have recommended taking the risk of certain -- we may as well call them warlike -- measures. He does not even try to conceal what motivated him to make this sensational statement: The reports on the hydrogen bomb, combined with the irrefutable proof that the opponent has at its disposal at least an equal potential of destruction, caused him to revise his political and strategic thinking. Is it not time to relinquish the eloquent manner of talking with which frowning subordinates and perplexed neighbors attempt to correct the "bad" impression this presidential frankness has made?

Furthermore, enough details have been reported in the American press in the meantime (one only has to select carefully the pieces of the mosaic) to give a clear picture of nuclear

realities. It would be worthwhile to make a special study of these details because those simply unimaginable catastrophies, from which those in the cities and industrial regions of America are not able to protect themselves, can also happen, and even sooner, to other threatened areas. As far as we are concerned it suffices if we strongly recommend to rely on Eisenhower's authority. It certainly would be unwise, even impolite, to play against it with these "massive" threats, by the use of which his Secretary of State tried at first to bluff his way out of an impossible situation. Anyhow, he has changed over to the "doctrine of do-not-use-force" some time ago.

Foster Dulles had also something to do with the "policy of strength" rhetoric. However, one must take into consideration that at the time he took over his office a break in the succession of nuclear illusions had just occurred. At first it was a monopoly; then it was the continually postponed "year of crisis," before which one did not concede that the Russians had any employable atomic weapons; then it was the "atomic umbrella" under the protection of which the military defensive action (and not only this) was to be developed; then it was ^{the} "atomic retaliation threat" which meant that one's own strategic air force was the superior one; then it was the "atomic stalemate," where it was admitted that both parties had an equally powerful potential to destroy the other -- one went through all these sobering periods when, at the end of 1952, the successful experiment with the hydrogen bomb again brought a change in the situation. A final chance seemed to have presented itself. However, nine months later the Russians broke also this monopoly. Another six months later the fateful 1 March 1954 arrived, when in Bikini, as Eisenhower expressed it so meaningfully, something had slipped through the fingers of the

scientists. The incident with the Japanese fishing boat followed which made all the nervous attempts at secrecy unsuccessful. Where so many hopes and disappointments were crowded into so few years it could indeed not have been simple to accompany a "dynamic" foreign policy with wise words.

What Now?

Many other factors help in making this dilemma complete: for instance, the unexpected speed displayed by the two main figures of the Bandung Conference, Chou and Nehru, to secure Asiatic key positions for Red China and neutral India; or the paralysis of France by the African disturbances, which, moreover, make the value of colonial bases in general quite questionable; or the neutralization of Austria and the break-up of the Balkan alliance which greatly weakened the NATO. However, the nuclear confusion described should be sufficient to make one understand the tendency of the American foreign policy as it has appeared since Geneva.

With or without Eisenhower's direct influence, his line of policy, the cardinal point of which is to avoid all war-like conflicts, will be continued. The time of "instant retaliation" is past; and one is not going to give any thought to employ atom bombers reduced to "tactical" weapons against Communist trouble-makers "at the place of our own choosing." From now on there will be no more "small" wars -- and the big one will be avoided in any case. Take notice, the threat of retaliation as such is not going to be abandoned. However, in this respect more emphasis is placed on the established self-interest in vital areas, which are not necessarily the borders of the country. In so doing, one believes

to be meeting the new policy of the Kremlin, where, as one has reason to assume, the same facts have caused the same conclusions to be drawn.

Accordingly, Foster Dulles will continue his efforts to get the most out of a jumbled situation though it was he who had brought it about. Being one of the most experienced international lawyers, it will not disturb him, rather he will favor it, if demands and counterdemands are very far apart. Only in this manner can the compromise aimed at become bearable. One should bear in mind with how much virtuosity Dulles carried out this course of action in Asia. He did not hesitate to go to Taipeh, Seoul, or Saigon, and he made every possible effort to improve his bargaining position. He was then by no means defeated in the diplomatic field; certainly, he did not break any of the numerous guarantees or agreements of alliance which, while praised as being the road signs to a policy of liberation, later on turned out to be milestones on the road back. Perhaps Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee expected altogether different results -- Mr Diem will have to have a little patience yet -- ^{but} there are many indications that Foster Dulles thought from the very beginning that it would be practical to put these Cold-War veterans into their well-earned retirement. Thus he succeeded with his somewhat rough lawyer methods, where his not quite so robust colleague Acheson had failed. Not only did he silence all opponents of a status quo in Korea and Formosa by pointing to their own contractual obligations, when the time seemed ripe after the tiresome bargaining, but at the same time he got into talks with the Chinese Reds.

The Election Campaign Has Begun

Foster Dulles will pursue more intensely this policy of persistently eliminating sources of threatening conflicts with the heirs of Stalin's power politics, who have been overrun by the atomic revolution and are sliding into a forced evolution. He may not be enthusiastic about it, but he realized quite clearly that one must not look ill-humored in an election year. If anyone, he would painfully miss Eisenhower's active support, because for his methods of negotiation Eisenhower's conciliatory spirit is just as indispensable as is a stubborn Molotov for smiling Bulganin-Krushchev. Only three months ago one could have assumed that a temporary exclusion of Eisenhower would bring back into play the Nixon-Knowland-Radford-Robertson group. This is no longer possible after Geneva, especially not after the invasion, when 48 Senators and Congressmen during the past eight weeks were able to penetrate the Iron Curtain, getting entirely new impressions, as well as expectations. Their surprisingly frank announcements make it clear that they will not return as missionaries of another crusade. They will tell the American people exactly what it would like to hear in its present frame of mind.

Only now will the Republicans have to pay for having tolerated much too generously the excesses of Mc Carthyism. The election campaign which has started prematurely because of Eisenhower's illness will no longer be centered on Communist hunts. Instead, those candidates who are behind in their coexistence thinking will be under pressure. It is quite clear that in this search for a constructive way out of the nuclear confusion the Democrats have a better chance. While they had to fight defensively on the Turman-Acheson line during the last election campaign, they can now come

forward with a fresh concept. It may be assumed that the excellent group of worldly-minded and liberal men who have gathered around Stevenson, as well as around Harriman and Kefauver, will not only achieve a regeneration of the Democratic Party but also a revision in foreign policy planning. Obsolete methods will disappear. The scanty beginning of Point Four, the opening up of the underdeveloped continents, which the Republicans so cruelly stunted, will bear fruit belatedly. The unified trade unions, led by such a forceful personality as Walter Reuther, who as early as 1950 had come forward with an imaginative plan, will have quite a bit to say. Otherwise neither nuclear coexistence is feasible, nor a moderate continuation of the sometimes breath-taking Eisenhower boom.

With Increased Enthusiasm

As paradoxical as it may sound, it is especially the dilemma of American foreign policy which will lead to its getting more effective. Undoubtedly it was temporarily weakened in the course of the atomic development. But the USA has not become weak because of it! On the contrary, all elements are present which, once this changed situation is clearly thought over, will put America in a stronger position in the coming negotiations -- as mediators, as guarantor power, and as the indispensable partner of coexistence.

Naturally, one must not approach this policy imagining it to be a transition period being wound up. Where everything is in flux one must not stand still, neither with preconceived opinions about irresistible change nor with yesterday's calculations regarding Washington's future actions and reactions.